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THE INNOVATION POLICY GAP
Traditional private and public innovation policies aim to bridge the gap
between incubation of the invention and commercialisation of the innova-
tion (Jolly, 1997). The private sector seeks competitive advantage through
innovation management by technological advancements (e.g. R&D, knowl-
edge acquisition) and collaborations (e.g. strategic alliances, cluster devel-
opment). The public sector seeks to provide support to the private sector to
overcome market failure in the corporate effort to bridge the innovation
gap. Optimal resource allocation is the objective in effectively managing to
bridge this innovation gap. As a crucial canon of mainstream neo-classical
economics, this resource optimality for invention ensures maximum eco-
nomic growth, and by implication, maximum economic welfare (Arrow,
1962). Using perfect competition as the benchmark, neo-classical econom-
ics sees mobile financial capital and human resources, together with low cost
public dissemination of technical knowledge, leading to the transition from
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invention to successful innovation by way of appropriate regional locations
(Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003, p. 86-7).
Two concerns arise with the neo-classical perspective of the innovation
policy gap which forms the basis of this paper. One is the link between opti-
mality and maximising economic welfare. The other is the automatic regional
response to innovation activity. Both are contested and an alternative frame-
work is outlined to address the innovation policy gap. Australia provides the
context for this discussion.
Traditional innovation policy based on optimal economic growth has
failed to deliver maximum social welfare in regional areas across the world.
In fact, regional economies face serious environmental challenges with the
scientific evidence clearly identifying greenhouse warming (or CO2 emis-
sions) as the cause of significant climate change over the next fifty years. For
example, the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 2008a) states that
Australia is likely to be more exposed to the impacts of climate change than
other developed economies due to four factors: (i) dry and variable conti-
nent, (ii) major agricultural base, (iii) terms of trade sensitive to Asian climate
change impacts, (iv) fragility of nearby highly exposed developing economies.
The first two factors point directly to the agricultural and regional economic
core of Regional Australia and its ability to adapt in meeting the climate
change challenge. Thus the focus of this paper is on an alternative innova-
tion policy framework for agricultural and regional economic development
that directly addresses most effectively climate change. This challenge is
particularly crucial in Australia because, along with USA and Canada, cur-
rent CO2 emissions are four times the global per capita average (Garnaut,
2008b, p. 31).
As an eminent economist, Garnaut (2008a) recognises the need for
investment in the transition to a low-emissions economy. He argues that
this transition can only occur through technological innovation, but how to
bring about this transition quickly and effectively is the major policy issue.
In his report Garnaut regularly mentions market failures as significant con-
straints on generating the market signals for optimal innovation-based tran-
sition. Yet, as a mainstream economist, Garnaut sees the market optimality
approach to the innovation policy gap as the only path to transition 2. Unfor-
tunately, this market optimality is the same economic approach that has
been used (and failed) over the last century in Australia to address environ-
2. See for example Garnaut (2008a, p. 426) where he states: “…market failures that impinge on
the efficient and competitive functioning of markets for new ideas and technologies are likely to
result in suboptimal levels of investment in innovation.”
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mental issues like river salination, water shortage, and lack of establishment
of non-fossil fuel energy.
Mainstream environmental economics and more recent ecological eco-
nomics have the same optimality approach, and this is seen as the conven-
tional wisdom to sustainable development to which no alternative framework
is identified 3. Optimality is strongly represented by economic development
policies of international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, anti-
inflation and budget restraint policies of independent central banks, and
market deregulation policies of western democracies; all which by late 2008
combined to usher in a major recession stemming from the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) 4. From the context of this paper, conventional wisdom is also
strongly embodied in cost-benefit analysis to unresolved significant environ-
mental issues of the type identified in Australia above. All these optimality-
based policies argue that this allows the private decision maker at a decentr-
alised local level to incorporate costs as a marginal adjustment to the scale and
form of any investment or spending decision with the objective of achieving a
stable optimal (equilibrium) outcome. Through this approach, the innovation
policy gap is bridged using private sector initiative financially and technically
dependant on corporate investment decisions; and public sector support aimed
to address any market failures arising from private sector investment.
The aim of this paper is to outline a challenge to this conventional
framework with respect to sustainable agricultural and regional develop-
ment. There is an alternative framework that allows a more effective transi-
tion to a low-emissions economy; one that relies on cooperation, rather than
competition and conflict, to bridge the innovation policy gap and deliver eco-
logically sustainable innovation (or eco-innovation 5). Lavoie (2006) identi-
fies post-Keynesian heterodoxy as the alternative economic paradigm that
adopts the cooperative model of economic development. However, Lavoie
does not tackle the way that this paradigm can be used to develop a climate
change framework towards a low-emissions economy. The task here is to
develop such an eco-innovation policy framework for regional economies.
From Stilwell (1974, p. 195), a region is delineated as a community of
interests with social cohesion and ecological unity. Social cohesion tends to
3. The late John Kenneth Galbraith for more than four decades, beginning with Galbraith
(1958), railed against what he called the “conventional wisdom” from where at that vantage
point any alternative was difficult to contemplate.  
4. For critical analyses of mainstream economic policies and their resulting impact on the GFC,
see Kregel (2008).
5. Van Berkel (2007a) defines “eco-innovation” as “…environment-informed and -driven
improvements and innovations in products, services and processes that deliver more value to
producers and/or consumers while progressively reducing net environmental impacts.”
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support conventional wisdom, while on the other hand; ecological unity
identifies strong environmental concerns that characterise a region. Appre-
hension exists in regions as they try to resolve this tension between conser-
vative economic policies and conservation of the environment. The
alternative framework provides a feasible resolution to this tension.
The next section of this paper outlines the conventional framework
derived from the neo-classical economics and argues why the optimality
approach will remain powerless to meet directly the climate change innova-
tion challenge in regional economies. The following section adopts the alter-
native satisficing approach to develop an “eco-sustainable framework” for
innovation policy in regional economies. This “eco-sustainable framework”
is an attempt to set a policy framework for regionally-based economic devel-
opment with consistent and workable public policy tools that encourage and
support entrepreneurial innovation that is greenhouse ecologically congru-
ent, and enacted by “ecopreneurs” (Schaper, 2005). The paper then outlines
practical applications in regional communities of this framework using con-
crete examples of ecological-based innovation strategies. Finally, the paper
examines the research and policy implications of this alternative framework
for a complete sustainable development innovation policy that bridges the
innovation policy gap while simultaneously addressing climate change.
Before going any further, sustainable development as a concept needs to
be defined. Sustainable development became popular in 1987 after the con-
temporaneous publication of the Bruntland Report (WCED, 1987) and the
environment pamphlet from the World Bank (1987) 6. In a general popular
sense, sustainable development refers to economic development which
“…meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.” (WCED, 1987, p. 8) Many actions
can be implemented in aiming towards this sustainable development concept
by people, organisations (especially businesses) and governments; including
energy efficiency, recycling, reduced planned obsolescence, improved mass
public transport. All such actions will significantly address the climate change
challenge. However, the underlying element that ensures sustainable devel-
opment is the embodied technology in capital plant and equipment that
enables the above actions to effectively prosper. The investment decision to
support eco-innovation is the focus of this paper, and it employs the policy
definition of sustainable development by Vercelli (1998, p. 268) where eco-
nomic development is “…considered sustainable only when future genera-
tions are guaranteed a set of options at least as wide as that possessed by the
current generation.”
6. For a short account of the genealogy of the term, see Vercelli (1998, p. 267-8).
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CONVENTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The optimality policy approach drives the market-based conventional frame-
work. In this framework, governments only set broad parameters within
which the private sector operates. At the macroeconomic level it involves
the setting of medium term targets on fiscal (for example, balanced budgets)
and monetary (for example, minimum inflation) public policies, so that
market forces can respond flexibly towards some stable market signals. With
this comes a deregulatory agenda to foster private investment strategy that
restructures away from protected mature industries to higher value added
growth industries. The aim is to provide the investment decision makers
with optimal efficient flow of market information and removing interven-
tionist public policies that distort this optimal market information by increas-
ing uncertainty and instability.
For environmental protection, the optimality approach recognises the
efficiency gains from market-based instruments (for example, tradeable
resource and emissions permits) over direct legal regulation (Godal and
Klaassen, 2006). This allows the private decision maker to incorporate envi-
ronmental costs as a marginal adjustment to the scale and form of the invest-
ment project, rather than just as a fixed regulated cost. From this overview
of environmental economics, the overwhelming impression is one of micro-
economic optimality. Research concentrates on valuation, types of instru-
ments and resource constraints within particular regulatory regimes; allowing
market signals to provide the appropriate environmental response (Eckers-
ley, 1995, p. 15).
Sustainable development is merely assumed in the macro perspective as
a future state that the economy reaches, but never analysed. Thus it can only
be assumed that the appropriate environmental market signals will elicit
allocatively efficient decisions (especially investment on capital stock) that
will ensure sustainable development. Modelling hypothetical states provides
neo-classical research with the basis to identify both cost-benefit valuations
(for example, Considine and Larson, 2006 on “cap and trade” emission trad-
ing permits in the Acid Rain Program) and various obstructions (for example,
Costello and Ward, 2006 on reluctance to invest in biodiversity protection) to
the ideal sustainable development macro-state.
Ecological economics is the alternative to environmental economics,
which has been dubbed “constrained market environmentalism” by Eckers-
ley (1995). However, the investment process operates the same way as with
mainstream economics but with an optimal scale of production where there
is a balance of material-energy throughputs into the economy that main-
tains the flows from the ecosystem at a constant sustainable level. This is
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called steady-state, and is a pre-analytical optimal setting. Size of the invest-
ment projects is predetermined, yet there exists market-based encourage-
ment to develop ecologically sustainable technology. Pearce and Atkinson
(1993) begin discussion of steady-state with: “To do this we adopt a neo-
classical stance and assume the possibility of substitution between ‘natural’
and ‘man-made’ capital” (p. 104, original emphasis). This analytical device
by ecological economists assumes overriding steady-state optimality.
The optimality approach for ecological economics reaches its nadir with
Sim (2006) where the neoclassical IS-LM macroeconomic model is extended
to an IS-LM-EE model. This model includes an environmental equilibrium
(EE) constraint that represents all interest rate-output combinations such
that the economy’s use of environmental services is exactly equal to the abil-
ity of the natural environment to supply them. Sim admits that “the model
imposes a strong assumption that policymaker has perfect knowledge of
what the environment constraint is…”, but more puzzling is the implication
that standard macroeconomic policy can induce supply of the natural envi-
ronment. Varying the interest rate is a blunt inefficient macroeconomic pol-
icy instrument, so it is quite improbable that such rate variations can also
induce appropriate environmental outcomes.
Vercelli (1998) argues cogently from first principles that uncertainty in
the market makes any optimisation algorithm based on substantive (or
unbounded) rationality impossible to be expressed in anyway that would
have operational significance 7. The elements of irreversibility and complex-
ity that arise over real historical time imply that an adaptive procedural (or
bounded) rationality is required. This means that the objective of sustain-
able development can only be achieved in a cumulative process of “learning
by doing” and acquiring knowledge through implementation of acceptable
adaptive (non-optimal) conventions and rules. Thus neither optimal approach
to the environment, neo-classical or steady-state, can deliver sustainable
development under conditions of market uncertainty. The result instead is
the type of market failures described earlier by Garnaut which fail to provide
adequate or even correct signals to induce eco-innovation 8.
7. In fact Costanza and Daly (1992, p. 45) acknowledge that “[u]ncertainty itself is one of the
critical factors that must be addressed in designing sustainable policies”, suggesting that a natural
capital depletion tax with some form of refundable assurance scheme to handle uncertainty.
Problem is that this type of scheme will be subject to the same speculative pressures (and bubble
booms) arising from capitalist uncertainty that occurs with any market-based policy strategy,
resulting in GFC-type crises.
8. For a more detailed critique of the optimality approach in relation to the environment, see
Courvisanos (forthcoming).
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From the regional perspective on the environment, market failures are
(or attempt to be) resolved by broad national and state government inter-
ventions. However, such interventions come up against individual regional
interests that militate against the required social cohesion and ecological unity
which make interventions successful. In Australia the unresolved Murray-
Darling Basin river salination is an example of how the concerns of specific
regional interests along the whole Murray-Darling river system have not
been addressed 9. Market failures are addressed by establishing (often after
community consultation) centralised ‘top-down’ adjustments to incentives,
regulatory responses and improved information provision. All such actions
can be useful, but regional interests (that are often divergent) can not be
integrated towards a long-term community strategy 10. The steady-state set-
ting of ecological economics resolves the same issues by beginning with an
optimal level and then uses that level to determine pricing and incentives.
Uncertainties attached to resource availability and use, as identified by
Adamson et al. (2005), make any such pre-analytic optimality constraints
highly contingent on what authorities have been able to centrally deter-
mine. Regional interests are marginal to the optimality policy approach of
both environmental and ecological economics, yet the real politics of the
environment dictate that regional interests must be seriously dealt with.
The existing economic optimality paradigm is clearly inappropriate for
responding effectively, timely and with regional awareness to crucial ecolog-
ical concerns like greenhouse warming. A completely different economic
framework, based on economic activity that is satisficing (under conditions of
ecological uncertainty) rather than optimising (under conditions of calcula-
ble risk) is required to address climate change.
9. Goss (2003, p. 619) reports on the Murray-Darling River Basin that: “There is no agreed pro-
cess for incorporating terrestrial biodiversity values at risk into a strategic response for dryland-
salinity management. This is a public policy issue to be addressed.” There is evidence that after
100 years, this public policy issue is finally being addressed with the COAG (Council of Austra-
lian Governments) Meeting of the 26 March 2008 agreeing to a new centralised water body and
significant new Federal funding. However, as The Australian editorial on the following day states:
“There is plenty of work yet to be done to decide what priority water projects will qualify for
Commonwealth funding and how best to deal with the thorny issue of buying back water rights
that have been over-allocated by state governments.” (27 March 2008, p. 17)
10. This problem can be evidenced by a quote from a neo-classical economics study that argues
“…that there is at least theoretical support for the notion of an optimal level of effort to devote to
any community consultation activity.” (Crase et al., 2005, p. 235, emphasis added)
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ECO-SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK 11
The following is presented as a specific detailed policy framework in the area
of investment and innovation to a sustainable development future divorced
of the optimality chimera. This is a two-step framework. First step is the pro-
vision of a bounded rationality (or satisficing) approach to the ecosystem
and its links to the economy, which enables the creation of a cumulative
iterative process towards sustainable development. Second step is to specify
a policy strategy that is based on a “bottom-up” development of customs and
norms around sustainable development, together with the requisite need for
a cumulative growth in effective demand beginning with niche markets that
have strong potential for demand expansion.
The policy framework aims to operate in a world of fundamental uncer-
tainty (Davidson, 1991) and cumulative change (Kaldor, 1966) within the
context of an innovative and sustainable environment. In terms of policy
action, the framework has satisficing rather than optimising objectives at its
base, as first espoused by Simon (1976) and since then adopted in behav-
ioural analyses (Earl, 1989). Vercelli (1998) has cogently argued that the
satisficing objective is required for efficiency and ethical reasons due to fun-
damental (or “hard”) uncertainty, irreversible processes, and strategic learn-
ing. These reasons add up to systemic (and not market) failure and thus need
a “designing rationality” that is “…aimed at designing a project of harmoni-
ous interaction between economic development and the natural environ-
ment and able to specify a strategy for its implementation.” (Vercelli, 1998,
p. 273)
As a policy framework, the political economy of the environment and
investment needs to deliver an innovation strategy that has a long-run sus-
tainable development scenario. The satisficing approach needs to be cumu-
lative and iterative in the short-run, developing strong market share and
effective demand for eco-innovations 12. As more information and knowl-
edge develops, the policy can be recalibrated towards a more sustainable
long-run outcome. The framework sets up guiding principles for transition to
sustainable development. Transition to a new path of economic develop-
ment is known as a traverse which results in regime change by the adoption
11. This section is a revised and shortened version of Section 3 of Courvisanos (2005).
12. The hybrid (petrol-electric) car is a recent example of how effective demand ensures growing
market share for an innovation. The problem is that this demand has come very belatedly out of
large petrol price rises (market signals). The technology has been around for a long time, but
there has not been any sustainable development planning process to introduce it earlier into cap-
italist economies. Current neo-liberal economic policies in advanced capitalist economies have
prevented such satisficing planning procedures advocated in this paper.
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of (i) leading edge knowledge, (ii) new practices and (iii) different social
organisations 13.
The procedural framework begins with identifiable goals and then devel-
ops a strategy of public intervention in order to meet Vercelli’s definition of
sustainable development specified at the start of this paper 14. Vercelli (1998,
p. 274) in his conclusion outlines systemic failure and why long-run goals
need to be established: One of the main reasons for the deterioration of envi-
ronmental problems may be ascribed precisely to the myopia of economic
agents increasingly obsessed by very short-run objectives. Short-run ratio-
nality produces a profound irrationality in the longer run. Only a broader
long-run rationality may produce a process of sustainable development avoid-
ing deep regrets.
The framework is based on the policy planning research of two traverse-
based economists. Together, the principles outlined from these two econo-
mists provide a paradigm shift in policies towards sustainable development.
First is Adolph Lowe’s supply side “instrumental analysis” as a way of using
“instruments” to achieve agreed goals. Lowe (1976) establishes an analytical
framework designed to enable rules of formal logic to be applied to economic
cause and effect sequences over historical time. This framework is particu-
larly aimed at using such cause-effect principles to set up state structural
adjustment policies that can deliver a sustainable, equitable and ecologically
supportive economic environment. This requires a shift away from existing
technological solutions. Lowe calls this “…the search for the economic
means suitable for the attainment of any stipulated end. To this procedure I
have assigned the label of instrumental analysis.” (Lowe, 1976, p. 11-12) 15
Forstater (1999) refers to this as “retroduction”, a search procedure that
works backwards from ends (in this case sustainable development) to means
(in this case planning by - what Lowe labels – “regressive inferences”).
Lowe argues that public policy instrumental analysis needs to concen-
trate on investment, which is the central element of any path to economic
growth. Thus, any path to sustainable development must primarily concen-
trate on the type of capital stock that will carry, via effective demand, the
13. Examples of past transitions are: sailing to steam ships (1850-1914), gas to electric power
(1878-1900), high to low death rates (1850-1900), residential coal to natural gas (1960-75),
typewriters to computers (1970-90). The first three in the list co-evolved. See Geels (2005) for
more details.
14. Goals, and targets, are crucial in any sustainable development planning project. Apprecia-
tion of the current systems that need to be transformed to achieve the appropriate sustainable
development goals is a basic strategy in all ecological economics towards sustainability (see Hir-
sch Hadorn et al., 2006).
15. See the excellent exposition of Lowe’s work in Oakley (1987).
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economy forward into the long-run. Analysis and evidence show that uncer-
tainty by the “mistake-ridden private sector” causes investment instability and
undermines any smooth effective path to economic growth (Courvisanos,
1996, p. 190-2) 16. Further, Lowe explains that in market-based economic
regions that lack relevant supportive physical and social infrastructure, there
is insufficient order and coherence to impel the creation and market demand
of innovative ecologically sustainable investment projects by the private
sector. A state structural adjustment policy with appropriate infrastructure
spending is needed to underpin the path to sustainable development.
Second is Micha  Kalecki’s demand side “perspective planning” (Kalecki,
1986). This is incorporated into the framework to provide an investment
strategy that establishes motivation and voluntary conformity towards eco-
logically appropriate goals. A path of dynamic diffusion of new technology
systems needs to be set up that is conducive to innovation in investment for
a sustainable physical environment. This requires a long-run investment
strategy with incrementally adjusting perspective planning. To achieve this
it is necessary to specify practical short-run targets that induce, through
effective demand, innovation in investment which eventually adds up to the
long-run goals specified. Thus, a traverse to eco-sustainable regime change
needs short-term feasible steps that fuse with targets set by the long-run
investment strategy. Targets need to be monitored and plans must be assessed
at regular short-term “end points” to see whether it is necessary to revise the
goals and the strategy for reaching the broad based long-run scenario. A per-
spective plan with these goals is set up to form a specific investment program
in consort with agreed ecological ‘rules’ that deliver the type of ecological
sustainability determined by the instrumental analysis.
In Kalecki (1963)’s study of planning dynamics, there are two specific
resource saving parameters that provide ecological-efficient criteria for rules
formulation. One is the coefficient of real depreciation, the aim of which is to
reduce this coefficient by proper maintenance and repair systems to equip-
ment and infrastructures. The other is the coefficient of better utilisation of
existing productive capacity. “Greater output may be obtained from existing
plant due to improvements in the organization of labour, more economical
16. See also Richardson (1960) for details on lack of coordination in markets for investment and
the systemic failures that this creates. The GFC that began in August 2007, and by early 2009
created the worst global economic recession since the 1930s, is the latest example of this insta-
bility due to “mistakes”. For example, the former chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland admit-
ted that the bank made “a big mistake” in buying Dutch bank ABN Amro (The Age, 12 February
2009, Bus p. 2). Richardson goes on to specify how investment coordination through informa-
tion agreements and industrial concentration can assist in developing micro-goals in policy ori-
ented strategies which can significantly avoid such big “mistakes”.
ł
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use of raw materials, elimination of faulty products, etc.” (Kalecki, 1963,
p. 16), thus reducing the coefficient’s value. Together these resource saving
coefficients provide a sound basis for ecological rules within a sustainable
investment strategy.
Barbier (1989) developed some ecologically sustainable rules that could
form the basis of any Lowe-Kalecki planning framework. These rules deal
with rates of both exploitation of natural resources and generation of wastes
that specific ecosystems can assimilate for long-run “carrying capacity” sus-
tainability. The problem is that different stakeholders (or interest groups) in
the economy use alternative critical load carrying capacity measures in rela-
tion to the ecosystem. Within the context of tourism, Hoffmann (1998)
identifies three carrying capacity measures that can be applied to the ecosys-
tem in general:
i. physical capacity as the absolute limit that a resource can cope with;
ii. ecological or real carrying capacity as the level beyond which there
are unacceptable ecological impacts for ecologists;
iii. social or effective carrying capacity as the level beyond which unac-
ceptable change occurs in the production of the good or service in
terms of overcrowding and altering social behaviour.
Large business interests tend to support (i). Small and local based busi-
nesses, public environmental bureaucracies and ecologists tend to support
(ii). The direct service providers “on the ground” (for example: national park
rangers, local environment groups, low impact ecosystem based services)
tend to support (iii). Kalecki’s resource saving coefficients can be applied to
all three capacity measures.
The perspective planning framework needs to first set up a dialogue
between all stakeholders on how to achieve a deeper ecosystem sensitive
market in any region or country using structural adjustment policies that
plan to alter the economic base of that area. The aim is investment, not in
“end of pipe” solutions to the ecosystem, but in an innovative proactive
strategy that significantly alters the operation of the economy using all the
tools available in the new information and communication technologies
(ICT). This requires understanding of the possible means to develop the
economy with ICT investment and an appreciation of the value of all three
carrying capacity indicators as rules for monitoring, evaluating and develop-
ing each stage in the plan. Networking between all the stakeholders over the
goals, means and their assessment must be rapid and continuous. Then pro-
cesses need to be arranged where constructive dialogue concentrates on the
means of achieving the goals based on the data available and rules used to
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assess this data. Once an investment plan has been developed, there must be
continual re-evaluation of these rules over time so that they are not static,
but instead reflect the latest innovative technological changes. This ensures
the constrained investment strategy is flexible and adaptable.
When setting up rules within either the planning process (e.g. low-emis-
sion public transport system), or regulating the market (e.g. emissions trad-
ing scheme), Hodge (1995, p. 56) explains that to have confidence in the
effectiveness of these rules “…any prescriptions will have to embrace a wide
range of capital assets and precautionary rather than optimising approaches
have to be adopted.” This supports the satisficing rather than the optimising
approach to sustainable development. An eco-sustainable framework can
provide a level of confidence that the rules can be adhered. Such confidence
induces innovation in investment, leading to revisions both in carrying capac-
ities and economic growth for future iterative re-evaluations of the perspec-
tive plan. This cumulative and feedback process has the ability to establish
precautionary rules to effectively meet the goal of sustaining the ecosystem,
while regularly evaluating and revising the rules for getting there.
Since it is impossible to define with any certainty what sustainability
requires, a risk-averse investment strategy needs to be initially introduced,
and not based on a static optimising (and optimistic) scale of production.
This clearly points to the use of the effective carrying capacity rate as the crit-
ical ruling measure. Over time what sustainability requires is a “shifting tar-
get” that depends on new information and technology becoming available
and on changing attitudes and expectations adopted by the generation that
has democratic public control (Hodge, 1995, p. 56). This democratic con-
trol implies grassroots input from the people who understand and operate
within the fragile ecosystem together with ability to influence directly the
goals and means used to develop the ecologically sensitive economy. This
strategy rejects superficial notions of democracy as some occasional voting
for representative leaders. Instead, this strategy embraces a more participatory
process that requires significant appreciation of the life support systems that
need to be taken into account (see Hirsch Hadorn et al., 2006).
In achieving the sustainability objective, Hoffmann (1998) argues for
strategic alliances and innovation networks between stakeholders. There are
vast ideological and business differences between all stakeholders, especially
with regards to their support for different carrying capacity rules. Under
these conditions, it seems networks across all stakeholders could be very ten-
uous. Democratic control requires networking across all parties with specific
details of the stipulated sustainable ends, but then decisions on the plans
and implementation must be arrived at by majority support. The minority in
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the network, even if more economically powerful, must accept the need to
act within the bounds of the majority based plan and policies.
This eco-sustainable framework provides cumulative effective demand
growth based on sustainability rules that aim to establish certainty within
which innovative investment by the private sector can flourish. Demand
growth is managed and nurtured by strong strategic niche markets in eco-
innovations. Continual iterative re-evaluation of investment plans encour-
age further innovation that lead to more acceptable and internationally com-
petitive sustainability rules. This creates self-reinforcing internal dynamics
that induce strong international competitiveness, growth and employment.
In summary, this framework has three crucial elements:
1. Cumulative effective demand that establishes a strong market.
2. Ecological rules that ensure capital investment is resource saving
with long-run carrying capacities which are sustainable.
3. Perspective, flexible and risk-averse investment strategy with dem-
ocratic control.
APPLICATION TO REGIONAL ECONOMIES
Although the complete eco-sustainable framework is not in evidence any-
where, elements of it can be seen in various regions/nations in developed
economies. There are many practical regional-based implementation strate-
gies currently in existence that are appropriate for the type of alternative eco-
sustainable framework proposed here. Experience from such diverse practical
environmental strategies can be incorporated into the proposed eco-sustain-
able innovative framework. It is this framework, and not merely a collection
of diverse practical strategies, that will deliver regime change to effectively
counter climate change. Regime change comes from “top-down” planning
and regulation by government policy. Then, entrepreneurial “bottom-up”
eco-innovation initiatives by business and other interest groups can estab-
lish niche demand solutions that grow with the support of this government
policy. The specific mix of top and bottom depends on the particular region
and the embeddedness in a region of current practices. This is where
regional innovation comes into its own.
By examining the experience of instituting regional innovation in the
peripheral region of Wales, Morgan (1997, p. 498) recognises the role of top-
down as setting the direction and bottom-up in driving demand. Success of
such an integrated mix depends on receptivity to such niche market develop-
ments depending on the “nuances” of the specific region under consideration.
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Morgan (1997, p. 496) argues that organisations need to modify their inter-
nal routines consistent with these regional nuances by promoting at least three
types of competence: technological (mastering technical aspects), entrepre-
neurial (integrate technologies with organisational strategy), and learning
(ability to absorb and use information). Organisations’ receptivity to the
stakeholders in the region - from government regional development officers
to competitors and customers (both actual and potential) - is central to
developing such competences.
From the experience of working for the US Environmental Protection
Agency, Norton (2005) diagnoses the shortcomings of US environmental
policy. Essentially, Norton’s argument is that the US policy lacks both a
problem-solving method and a willingness to evaluate and improve on (or
discard) policy experiences. This indicates a lack of iterative learning com-
petence, despite USA’s strength in the other two competences (Morgan,
1997, p. 492). To overcome this problem, Norton advocates a social science
research method to complement the dominance of neo-classical economics,
this being an iterative process of experiential learning from appropriate
practice and then adapting towards a better outcome. Norton’s pragmatic
strategy embodies procedural rationality, but is deficient of a long-run satis-
ficing objective of a stipulated sustainable goal that all environmental poli-
cies need to embrace.
The European experience in transition to sustainable development by
eco-innovations is much deeper than anywhere else on the globe and is
much more pragmatic and iterative than USA, but much less entrepreneur-
ial. In mainland Europe, there is a strong optimistic top-down drive to
achieve ecological goals. René Kemp has researched bottom-up European
entrepreneurial regionally-based eco-innovations in niche markets, notably
in transportation (Kemp and Rotmans, 2004), energy (Kemp and Loorbach,
2005), and waste management (Kemp and Andersen, 2004). Kemp sees
these innovations as being influenced by top-down public policy initiatives
through the use of markets, hierarchy and institutions. Market influence is
when permissible limits are set and the market establishes permit price (e.g.
regulated emissions trading scheme17). Hierarchical influence is when eco-
nomic activities are centrally coordinated (e.g. urban transport planning18).
Institutional influence is strongly regional through setting standards, estab-
lishing trust, creating networks and sharing beliefs (Parto, 2005). Together
the three public policy influences form the essential transition management
tools.
17. See Ellerman and Buchner (2007).
18. See City Of London (2007)
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As Norton (2005) notes, it is the iterative feedback strategy that can revi-
talise local communities. In Australia, the regional (non-metropolitan) com-
munities are physically closer to the ecosystem and have definite (sometimes
very contrasting) values that allow potentially effective bottom-up voices to
be heard in the development process. Because of this specific environment,
the innovation system in Australia has historically “avoided top-down direc-
tion setting in the research sector, with a preference for allowing organisa-
tions to exercise considerable autonomy in deciding what research to pursue.”
(OECD, 2005, p. 326) Such a long standing institutional set up allows for
strong bottom-up iterative feedback. The best example of this is CSIRO, a
key institution in Australia’s innovation system, which began as a public
R&D organisation dealing with fundamental agriculture related science to
improve productivity 19. This involved central R&D laboratories, but also a
large extensive network of advisory field officers throughout the rural farm-
ing communities to offer practical regional advice in implementing new
innovations and providing feedback to central laboratories. CSIRO has now
extended its research into “20 research areas, including agribusiness, health,
environment, natural resources, ICT, manufacturing, services, sustainable
minerals and energy…[with] a stronger focus on commercialisation of its
research” (OECD, 2006, p. 312).
Australian Governments have been influenced strongly by neo-classical
economists in adopting the neo-liberal innovation policy stance of short-
term market-driven prioritisation and not “picking winners”. Extension of
CSIRO’s research areas and its focus on commercialisation reflect this mar-
ket-driven orientation over the last 20 years. This has been to the detriment
of any long-run top-down planning and regulation. Detailed specific research
direction by government planning should be avoided and experts need to
follow their own judgement, however, broad innovation directions need a
satisficing objective. In the present circumstances this needs to be eco-inno-
vation. Previous examples of the Australian Government recognising sys-
temic (not merely market) failure and responding by ‘picking’ successful broad
directions to encourage innovation can be listed as: CSIRO (in agriculture),
Screen Australia (previously the Australian Film Commission, AFC), Aus-
tralian Institute of Sport (AIS), and the Pharmaceuticals Partnerships Pro-
gram (P3) 20.
19. See Collis (2002) for the history of the CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation).
20. For economic evaluation of these innovation policy directions see the following; on CSIRO
see Hastings (1977), on AFC see Molloy and Burgan (1993), on AIS see Hogan and Norton
(2000), on P3 see Deloitte Insight Economics (2008).
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Political economy tension occurs between Australia’s short three-year
electoral cycle that encourages short-term populist policy making and imple-
menting a long-run strategy which requires bipartisan support. In times of
national crisis bipartisan support for regime change via new innovation policy
direction can emerge; for example CSIRO emerged after the 1890s Depres-
sion to develop agriculture and AIS emerged after no gold medals from the
1976 Montreal Olympic Games. However, such occurrences are rare, and
even at the time of writing in March 2009, no bipartisan policy has emerged
out of the GFC. Dyson (2009) argues that clean technology needs to be the
new innovation direction for Australia out of the GFC.21 The eco-sustain-
able framework developed above, with its strong regional focus, provides the
policy pathway for this direction.
In the eco-sustainable framework, any regional bottom-up initiatives
should dovetail in a co-ordinated manner into an overall national top-down
sustainable development agenda. This agenda should aim to reflect agreed
global environmental protocols and regulations. Like Russian dolls, each
smaller regional focus must neatly fit into the larger regional focus. Given
the uncertainty in the future, the ‘fitness’ is more on common strategy with
different iterative paths of transition to ecological targets within specified
long-term international protocols. These protocols need to gradually incor-
porate developing economies as their levels of economic activity begin to
have significant global environmental implications.
Figure 1 summarises the argument of this paper in the grid and provides a
flowchart of the investment planning process on the bottom. The left col-
umn has the three pillars of the eco-sustainable framework. The centre col-
umn sets out the criteria for sustainable development required in both public
and private sector investment planning within specific institutional and cul-
tural domains. The right column shows how specific Australian regional-
based practical greenhouse strategies for innovation have the potential to
support the proposed investment plan. The bottom row is a flowchart which
indicates how each column should interact. The flowchart is a practical pro-
cedure for a coherent planning process. This framework offers a cohesive
plan for investment that allows specific strategies to induce eco-innovation.
This then takes the strategies out of the environmental divisions of the pub-
lic/private sectors and locates them in the central decision-making processes.
Then, the environment is no longer a separate strategy, but instead a stipu-
21. Dyson (2009) supports this argument by noting that 20 years ago Australia was a leader in
the first wave of clean energy innovations now powering the world. All this technology and its
innovators exited Australia as neo-liberal short-term market priorities dominated the policy
landscape.
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lated end that is integrated in the strategic management and planning of any
(and every) organisation.
Focus now moves to identifying regional applications that appear in the
right-hand column of Figure 1. These are all examples that have been
appraised by other authors, and they are placed within the context of the
eco-sustainable framework. Currently all such examples (and there are many
more throughout Australia that are not mentioned here) make up a plethora
eco-sustainable “patches” that are not connected together into some coher-
ent patchwork. All the examples mentioned have developed strong regional
niche markets, but for an effective transition to sustainability there is a need
to have all three elements linked together with the investment criteria in
the second column. This linking must first be at one region, and then
extended to other regions with ties across regions. An example of linking
the patches together to effect a regime change transition in the past was the
automobile. What changed a quaint niche activity into the major transpor-
tation system of the 20th Century was government planning of roads, traffic
lights and related infrastructure, together with the business development of
petrol stations, auto-mechanics, tow truck operations, road service and the
like. Integration of such diverse activities occurred as public planning was
linked to road carrying capacities, with flexible road developments that were
evaluated in the context of user demand for the new innovation 22. The
greenhouse gas imperative requires the petrol-driven automobile to be
placed in the “dustbin” of history, but technological lock-in is a powerful
force which regime change must defeat.
Regional implementation examples identified in Figure 1 begin with eco-
logical rules; one example is a business establishing ecological rules, while
another example concentrates on communicating such rules. Pig Pen is a
sustainable intensive pig farming operation in North East Victoria using the
triple bottom line with a strong adaptive capacity over seven years and a tiny
ecological footprint (Penniceard, 2007).23 This commercial operation is a
pointer to a major shift required in agriculture in which new ecological agri-
cultural rules are established. “The Break” Newsletter provides information
throughout the broad cropping regions of Victoria and southern New South
Wales on climate change and seasonal risk factors. This online newsletter
has the basis for communicating new ecological rules and reducing uncer-
tainty in a highly climate variable environment (Price et al., 2008).
22. For a history of the automobile and the environment around it, see Wachs and Crawford (1992).
23. Agriculture has a relatively large ecological footprint in Australia. “Greenhouse gas emis-
sions from agricultural production represented approximately 16% of total national emissions in
2005, a proportion higher than that of any other OECD country apart from New Zealand.”
(Department of Climate Change, 2008)
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Figure 1 – The Eco-sustainable Framework
At the regional perspective planning level, two examples of iterative
flexible planning, monitoring and evaluation are VCCAP and CMAs.
Under the Victorian Climate Change Adaptation Program (VCCAP) an
interdisciplinary team from the University of Melbourne and two Victorian
state departments undertake research, communication and policy develop-
ment for agricultural industries in the context of climate change problems
(Griffin and Eckard, 2007). Natural Management Regions across Australia
lead the cost-effective protection and enhancement of the land and water
resources in network of 56 distinct regions under the National Action Plan
for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) and are evaluated in Head (2005).
Water Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs) in Victoria imple-
ment the NAP and provide the basis for adaptive environmental policies.
Australia has been very successful at developing many strategic niche
bases for eco-sustainable management which enable cumulative effective
demand to be built for growing awareness in, and demand for, natural envi-
ronment ‘goods’. Probably the most successful one of these is Landcare, a
national community-based network that is government and corporate-funded.
Established in 1989, Landcare implements landscape improvement (e.g.
plant trees) and develops a positive attitude to sustainable land management
through education (Huthwaite, 2007). Community-focused, with the state
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(1994) recognises the lack of a top-down institutional strategy as the strength
in this participatory activity. This network strategy has been adopted by
Coastcare to manage the coast, but with more state input from the Victorian
Government. From another angle on strategic niche management, Smart-
Green is a new initiative by the University of Ballarat and Ballarat Council
to assist a cluster of small businesses in the Ballarat region to be more entre-
preneurial and access new business opportunities from sustainable environ-
mental policies and the development and delivery of environmental services.
Some idea of the extent of success by such “ecopreneur” (Schaper, 2005) ini-
tiatives as SmartGreen can be discerned in Van Berkel (2007b) where he
reviews the Cleaner Production and Eco-Efficiency initiatives from 30 Aus-
tralian small firms that participated in these two eco-innovation govern-
ment-funded programs.
IMPLICATIONS
The basic argument in this paper is that all economies need to undertake
regime change from high-emissions to low-emissions. This transition to sus-
tainable development requires a paradigm shift in the production and distri-
bution of economic activity, and can only occur via eco-innovation. An
optimising approach to this transition is rejected in favour of a satisficing
approach under conditions of large market uncertainty that occurs in peri-
ods of structural change. The analytics of two economists who concentrated
their efforts on understanding how economies go through regime change
have been employed to develop this policy framework. The Lowe-Kalecki
eco-sustainable framework provides a cumulative iterative process that encour-
ages eco-innovation to meet short-run satisficing objectives that dovetail
into long-run sustainability. The framework consists of a combination of
three critical elements together with a nationwide systemic investment pro-
cess strategy that funds and supports eco-innovation at all levels of society.
The previous section identified examples of regional eco-innovation and
showed how they would fit into the eco-sustainable framework. Thus,
aspects of the framework are already deployed around Regional Australia,
but they are all small and disparate. What is missing is a coherent structure
and pattern to all these diverse and ad hoc occurrences. Two regional impli-
cations emerge from the eco-sustainable framework. One implication is the
adaptive governance strategy that regional authorities need to adopt towards
global environment problems. This requires recognition of local develop-
ment of customs and norms around sustainable development that create
social cohesion and ecological unity. Conflicts will inevitable arise (e.g. local
opposition to wind farms), but such conflicts can be overcome at the local
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level through the adaptive governance strategy to the satisficing objective
outlined above. National and international protocols and regulations enable
such localised conflicts to be resolved in a coherent manner consistent with
sustainable development.
The second implication is based on the “Butterfly Effect” as it is applied
to economic systems (Ormerod, 1998).24 This effect can be applied to small
niche eco-innovations by recognising that local consequences will be ampli-
fied via flow-on diffusion effects in the evolution of the new sustainable
development paradigm, but within the context of the agreed global/national
ecologically sustainable rules and the perspective plan governing the new
paradigm. As diffusion proceeds, learning takes place that improves the inno-
vation in its adaptation to different regional circumstances. Over time the
rate of diffusion will rise quickly (Rosenberg, 1972).
Research implications relate to adopting the eco-sustainable framework
as a benchmark to monitor and evaluate the various regional programs and
initiatives that develop. Rather than simply describing and critiquing a pro-
gram, this eco-sustainable framework enables the researcher to find what are
the elements of the program that support the new transition paradigm and
what are the missing or negative features of a specific program that work to
detract from the transition. It can also lead to an iterative process of identi-
fying the strengths of a regional program that the current policy is not address-
ing, then the policy must adapt to allow the regional initiative to create a
strong “butterfly effect”. From the opposite angle, rates of diffusion of eco-
innovations will vary from region to region depending on economic, cultural
and technological factors. Given the diversity of alternative sustainable
activities (e.g. sources of energy like wind, solar, geothermal, tidal, biomass,
nuclear, bio-fuels) such variety needs to be encouraged and supported in the
perspective plan, if these activities are within the context of the paradigm
transition that has been mapped out. Here the research effort must be to
identify the diffusion of eco-innovations (technologies and activities) and
focus on whether scarce resources are being used in the most effective meth-
ods for commercialisation. This is where researching the strength of regional
input can more clearly identify commercial possibilities 25.
24. The Butterfly Effect, proposed by Edward Lorenz in 1963, argues that the flapping of a but-
terfly’s wing would cause a disturbance that becomes exponentially amplified so as to eventually
affect large-scale atmospheric motion. Ormerod (1998) described the same effect by a biological
experiment on ants, showing that an ant goes out and finds food which encourages others to fol-
low it back to its source. The self-reinforcing mechanism with ants is very strong. From an evo-
lutionary economics perspective, Ormerod applied this mechanism to economic activities at a
local level to show both positive and negative outcomes.
25. For an example of how to use this eco-sustainable framework to analyse an environmental
policy and the role of regional input, see Courvisanos and Jain (2006).
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The eco-sustainable framework is an approach that can be applied to any
economy, using regional communities and their networks as the bulwark for
democratically devising ecological rules in a nationally stipulated precau-
tionary low-emissions economy target. Then, regions can strongly input into
a national “perspective plan” with regional targets and creating strategic
niche regional markets to implement these strategies. Critical mass for sus-
tainable development is the objective. This is the specific approach to meet-
ing the innovation policy gap that supports sustainable development through
regional input and iterative learning. With the onset of the Global Financial
Crisis and the most severe recession since the 1930s, the year 2009 provides
basis for creative destruction of the old technological system and a shift to
eco-innovation sustainable development by the framework set out in this
paper. Bailing-out and supporting the mistaken-ridden discredited capitalists
of the current energy inefficient technological system will only delay this
shift. This new framework must be applied immediately.
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